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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND 
PROJECT FINANCE IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: BLURRING TilE 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
DINESH D. BANANI* 
Abstract: Project Finance has become an increasingly attractive tech-
nique for financing infrastructure projects in developing countries over 
the last twenty years. Furthermore, the use of project financing raises 
difficult legal issues with respect to the ability of developing countries' 
governments to control the provision of public services that are 
intimately connected to these infrastructure projects. Sponsors of 
project finance transactions have been relatively successful in dealing 
with these legal issues by negotiating for international arbitration as the 
primary forum for resolving potential disputes with the host gov-
ernment. However, as the Himpurna and Patuha power projects in 
Indonesia reveal, a disciplinary bias exists in the minds of international 
arbiters with respect to project finance disputes between foreign in-
vestors and state entities. This bias has important implications for the 
future of economic relations between rich and poor nations and the 
prospects for economic growth in developing countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
As developing countries have struggled to modernize and indus-
trialize over the past century, their demand for infrastructure devel-
opment has grown at a staggering rate. 1 To meet this demand for in-
frastructure development, developing countries have looked in-
creasingly to international project finance to build roads and con-
struct plumbing and electricity systems.2 Project finance is a debt 
finance technique used for the development of a public infrastructure 
project where lenders rely primarily on the cash flow produced by the 
*Dinesh D. Banani is an Executi\'e Editor of the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 William U. Stelwagon, Financing Private Energy Projects in the Third World, 37 CATH. 
LA\\'. 45, 45 ( 1996) 0 
2 See Catherine Pedamon, How Is Convergence Best Achieved in International Project Fi-
nance?, 24 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ 1272, 1272-73 (2001 ). 
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project to service their loan rather than on other sources of payment 
such as government guarantees or project sponsors' assets or credit.3 
Project finance has several advantages, such as the opportunity for 
investors to participate directly in an otherwise inaccessible and lucra-
tive-albeit risky-market and the ability to participate in high-risk 
investments without diminishing creditworthiness.4 
Despite the appeal of project finance, the extensive amount of 
political risk associated with the unstable legal regimes of developing 
countries has forced many investors seeking to finance and construct 
projects in developing countries to address appropriately and allocate 
this political risk.5 As a result, investors have increasingly sought to 
negotiate international arbitration provisions into their financing 
agreements to provide a more efficient and favorable means of dis-
pute resolution for conflicts that arise from project finance transac-
tions.6 Developing countries, however, have argued that international 
arbitration is inherently biased against them because the procedures 
for arbitration are based on notions that international projects involve 
private lawmaking and, therefore, should not be governed in any way 
by public concerns that may justify the suspension or cancellation of 
contractual obligations under a financing agreement.7 . 
This note will assess and analyze the proposition that the gov-
ernments of developing countries sometimes are justified in en-
croaching on the rights of foreign investors and lenders in project 
finance transactions for the purpose of maintaining their sovereignty 
over the important public services that project financing usually pro-
vides. Part II of the note provides important background information 
on the workings of project finance, international arbitration, and the 
relationship between these two forms of conflict resolution or risk 
minimization. This Part also provides background information on the 
public/ private distinction and the way in which arbitration proceed-
ings can place the public and private lawmaking aspects of in terna-
tional project finance at odds with each other. The Patuha and Him-
3 Id. at 1273. 
4 David Blumental, Sources of Funds and Risk Management for International Energy Projects, 
16 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 267, 270 (1998); Christopher J. Sozzi, Project Finance and Facilitating 
Telecommunication Infrastructure Development in Newly-Industrializing Industries, 12 CoMPUTER 
& HIGH TEcH. LJ. 435,447 (1996). 
5 Stelwagon, supra note 1, at 54-55. 
6 See Christopher Dugue, Dispute Resolution in International Project Finance Transactions, 
24 FoRDHAM lNT'L LJ. 1064, 1065 (2001). 
7 See Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under 
theSpecterofNeoliberalism, 41 HARV. Iwr'L LJ. 419,465 (2000). 
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purna energy projects in Indonesia will be used as dual case studies to 
analyze this proposition. Through specific illustrations from the Him-
puma and Patuha energy projects, Part III delineates important issues 
that the intersection of project finance, international arbitration, and 
development raises for the argument that an inherent bias still exists 
between developed and developing countries in international com-
mercial arbitration proceedings. Part IV takes each of these issues in 
turn and applies them to. the Himpurna and Patuha case studies to 
argue that there is still a disciplinary bias in the minds of interna-
tional arbiters with respect to project finance disputes between for-
eign investors and state entities in developing countries. The note 
concludes by arguing that this bias has important implications for the 
future of relations between rich and poor nations and the prospects 
for economic growth in developing countries. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Brief Primer on International Project Finance 
Historically, infrastructure projects have been public works 
funded by public funds, usually either tax revenues or proceeds from 
government bonds.8 They generally have been too costly for private 
sector participation because of the large initial capital outlay, the slow 
rate of return, and the risk that the project may never be profitable.9 
Many developing country governments regarded the services that in-
frastructure projects provide-such as sewer systems, telecommunica-
tions services, and public electricity-as public goods and, therefore, 
services that should be provided with the mandate of the welfare 
state. 10 
However, in the last twenty years, infrastructure development has 
been funded increasingly by private sources of capital.i 1 This private 
funding increasingly comes from outside the developing nation in the 
form of foreign direct investment. 12 The increase in receptiveness to 
foreign direct investment was spurred by the inability of governments 
8 Edward C. 1\fcCutcheon, Think Globally, (En)Act Locally: Promoting Effective National En-
vironmental Regulatory Infrastructures in Developing Nations, 31 CoRNELL lNT'L LJ. 395, 411 
(1998). 
9 !d. 
IO Nagla Nassar, Project Finance, Public Utilities and Public Concems: A Practitioner's Perspec-
tive, 23 FoRDHAM Iwr'L LJ 60, 60 (2000). 
11 McCutcheon, supra note 8, at 411. 
12 !d. 
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to pay for large-scale infrastructure projects because of growing fiscal 
deficits, increasing financial instability, and consequently stagnating 
rates of economic growth.l3 
Project financing is the most important legal and financial means 
by which this shift to private development in infrastructure growth has 
taken place.14 It involves a method of private financing where the re-
payment of the funds borrowed for an infrastructure project is de-
pendent upon the revenue generated by the project itself. 15 Project 
finance has been used to fund projects in a wide range of industries, 
including oil and gas, electricity, telecommunications, transportation 
(e.g., toll roads), and natural resources (e.g., copper mines and gold 
mines). 16 
The sponsors of the project are usually large investors, both do-
mestic and foreign, who take an equity stake in the projectP The 
lenders for a project are primarily large international commercial 
banks, such as Deutsche Bank and JP Chase Securities, or multilateral 
lending agencies, such as the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD).18 
The first step in setting up a project financing usually involves the 
sponsors forming a project company, which is designed to construct, 
own, and operate the project facility. 19 This project company is a cor-
poration that is owned and managed by the sponsors and is designed 
to borrow funds for the project from the lenders. 20 Since the project 
company, and not the sponsor itself, is the entity that is borrowing 
funds for the project, the project does not affect the balance sheet or 
creditworthiness of the sponsor directly.21 The lenders loan money to 
the project company with the assets and cash flow of the project act-
ing as the security interest for the project loans.22 The lenders, fur-
thermore, loan this money with the expectation of a constant cash 
flow from the project and a continuous operation of the project.23 To 
13 See Nassar, supra note 10, at 60. 
14 McCutcheon, supra note 8, at 412. 
15 Nassar, supra note 10, at 62. 
16 PETER K. NEVITT, PROJECT fiNANCING 1 (4th ed. 1983). 
17 Nassar, supra note 10, at 62. 
18 See id. at 63. 
19 See Pedamon, supra note 2, at 1273. 
20 Id. 
21 See Blumental, supra note 4, at 270. 
22 See Nassar, supra note 10, at 62. 
23 I d. at 65. 
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realize these goals, the lenders use contractual agreements with the 
sponsors of the project to guard against potential threats.24 The spon-
sors, in turn, seek guarantees from the host government that it will 
provide the necessary assurances to keep the project running 
smoothly. 25 
The Dabhol power project in India, which completed its 
financing in 1995, is a good example of how a project financing works 
in practice.26 Three sponsors, Enron Corporation, General Electric 
Capital Corporation and Bechtel Enterprises, invested funds into the 
project by creating a project company called Dabhol Power Com-
pany.27 This project corporation then independently borrowed funds 
for the project from multilateral lending agencies, local lenders and a 
syndicate of investment banks.28 The security these lenders sought for 
providing these funds were the assets and cash flow of the project en-
tity, the Dabhol Power Company.29 
Sponsors obtain several commercial advantages by financing a 
project in this manner.3° First, if the project fails to fulfill its loan obli-
gations to the lenders, the only recourse the lenders have is to the as-
sets of the project corporation itself. 31 They have no recourse to any 
of the assets on the parent corporation's balance sheet.32 Second, 
since the project corporation is acting as the borrower of funds, the 
parent corporation's credit rating is unaffected even though the cor-
poration is investing in a long-term project that is borrowing millions 
of dollars in the frequently unstable environment of developing coun-
tries.33 
Furthermore, financing a project through project financing can 
be a vehicle for social and economic development for developing 
countries because it is a relatively ·economically efficient way to 
finance public works projects that affect the lives of millions of people 
in the country.34 It is also an important channel for developed and 
developing countries to become more economically integrated be-
24 !d. 
25 See id. at 63-64. 
26 See Dablwl Fina11cing, INT'L CoRP. L., Apr. 1995, at 2. 
27 !d. 
28 !d. 
29 Sec Nassar, supra note I 0, at 62. 
30 Sozzi, supra note 4, at 447. 
31 Sec Pedamon, supra note 2, at 1273. 
32 Blumen tal, supra note 4, at 270. 
33 Sec id. 
34 Sec Pedamon, supra note 2, at 1274; sec also Nassar, supra note 10, at 65. 
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cause some of the projects funded through project finance involve the 
exploration of commodities that are primarily exported to developed 
countries.35 
However, project finance also presents significant risks to spon-
sors and lenders.36 Risk factors in a project financing come in a variety 
of strains, including currency-related risks, risks of government de-
fault on payment guarantees, and risks of civil unrest in the country.37 
Arguably, the most important risks may be those associated with the 
political and legal instability of the host nation.38 
The Dabhol power project provides an excellent illustration of 
the political risks involved in project finance. 39 When the project 
completed its financing, the local state of Maharashtra was run by the 
Congress Party, which was very amenable to increasing the participa-
tion of foreign investors in infrastructure projects in India.40 However, 
in March of 1995, the right-wing nationalist opposition Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) gained control of Maharashtra and its opposition 
to the Dabhol power project was a linchpin of its campaign plat-
form.41 
On August 3, 1995, the BJP stated its intention to stop construc-
tion of the Dabhol power project and abandon the completed parts of 
the facility.42 The BJP made various claims in support of its action, in-
cluding that the project was environmentally unsound, that the elec-
tricity rates resulting from the project would be unaffordable to the 
population, and that the project was too costly and was awarded with-
out a competitive bid.43 Although Enron did try to commence arbitra-
tion proceedings in London and legal action in the United States 
against the state government, the company was eventually able to 
terminate these proceedings and renegotiate the terms of the con-
tract. 44 
35 See generally Ken Miyamoto, Measuring Local Legal Risk Premium in Project Finance 
Bonds, 40 VA. J. lN'r'L L. 1125, 1127 (2000) (providing background on project finance 
transactions). 
36 Blumental, supra note 4, at 271. 
37 See generally Stelwagon, supra note I, at 55-60. 
sa See id. at 60. 
39 See Daniel Mazzini, Stable International Contracts in Emerging Markets: An Endangered 
Species1, 15 B.U. lNT'L LJ. 343,355 (1997). 
-w See id. at 352. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. 
43 /d. at 352-53. 
44 See Mazzini, supra note 39, at 353-54. 
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The Dabhol power project example illustrates that project 
financiers must take great caution in deciding whether the host na-
tion has a legal and political system that is conducive to private in-
vestment in infrastructure projects. 45 Furthermore, this risk is am-
plified when one considers the public importance of many of these 
projects, since they render public services-such as water, electricity, 
telecommunications, or transportation-that are of public concern 
and politically sensitive.46 As a result, many host governments can in-
stitute policies regarding public services that may adversely affect the 
rights and obligations of international lenders and sponsors under 
project finance agreements.4' To counteract these complex risks, 
many sponsors and lenders have begun to negotiate successfully for 
international arbitration as the method for dispute resolution with 
respect to the project agreements.4B 
B. International Arbitration and Project Finance 
1. The Perceived Advantages oflnternational Arbitration in Project 
Finance Transactions 
In drafting forum selection clauses for international project 
finance agreements, international sponsors have had a clear prefer-
ence for the domestic courts of their seat or place of business.49 In 
practice, this has meant that there has been a trend towards the selec-
tion of U.S. or English courts as the forum for dispute resolution be-
cause of the sponsors' and lenders' relations with the financial centers 
in New York or London and the applicability of New York or English 
law to the agreement under consideration.5° 
However, in recent years, project financing participants increas-
ingly have grown aware that even the simplest project financing struc-
ture includes a network of various interrelated agreements between 
the sponsors, lenders, insurance companies, and host governments.51 
The multi-contractual, multi-party aspect of the transactions creates 
multi-party disputes.52 These multi-party disputes could arise between 
45 See id. at 371. 
46 Nassar, supra note IO. at 65. 
4' See Stelwagon, supra note I, at 60 (pro,·iding examples of host government policies). 
48 See Dugue, supra note 6, at I074. 
49 /d. at I 065. 
50 /d. at I 072. 
51 /d. at I 076. 
52Jd. 
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multiple parties to a single agreement containing a single choice of 
forum clause or, more problematically, between different parties to 
different multi-party agreements containing different choice of forum 
clauses. 53 
As a result of its ability to deal better with these problems, inter-
national arbitration appears to offer a more effective dispute resolu-
tion mechanism than a domestic court in cases of these multi-party 
disputes, which pervade project finance transactions.54 For instance, 
in many project finance transactions, there will be a master project 
agreement and various subsidiary agreements.55 If a dispute arises 
under the master agreement between the parties of the transaction, it 
is likely that a dispute has also arisen with respect to one of the sub-
sidiary agreements. 56 Furthermore, if an arbitral tribunal has jurisdic-
tion over the master agreement through an arbitration clause, it is 
likely that they will also have jurisdiction over the subsidiary agree-
ments.57 In contrast, without a written arbitration clause in the sub-
sidiary agreement, it is unlikely that a domestic court would be able to 
obtain jurisdiction over the subsidiary agreement and the parties to 
it. 58 
Another aspect of international arbitration that makes it a more 
attractive dispute resolution process in the eyes of foreign investors is 
the fact that it is a private process.59 This is especially important for 
investors who want the details of their quarrels with the governments 
of developing countries kept quiet from the public.60 This advantage 
may be acute in the project finance process when one considers the 
public importance of many of these projects.6I 
The private nature of the arbitration process also provides for-
eign investors the opportunity to make the process very flexible and 
adaptable without much interference from public bodies.62 For in-
stance, arbitration offers the parties the opportunity to choose their 
own decision-maker in a way that is usually not possible in court pro-
53 Dugue, supra note 6, at 1076. 
54 Id. at 1077. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. 
57 ld. 
5s Dugue, supra note 6, at 1077. 
59 MARK HUNTER & ALAN REDFERN, LAW AND PRAGI1CE OF lNTERNKilONAL COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION 23 (2d ed. 1991). 
60 See id. 
61 See Nassar, supra note 10, at 65. 
62 HuNTER & REDFERN, supra note 59, at 23. 
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ceedings.63 One or more arbitrators could be chosen for their special 
skill and expertise in project finance transactions and, consequently, 
have the ability to grasp salient issues of fact or law in the dispute so as 
to save the parties time and money.64 Furthermore, in an arbitral tri-
bunal, the rules of procedure and evidence can also be tailored to a 
particular project finance transaction in a way that they could not be 
in the domestic courts.65 
In spite of the potential advantage to investors and sponsors, in-
ternational arbitration has not been very effective in resolving project 
finance disputes. 66 In fact, the Himpurna and Patuha project finance 
arbitrations in Indonesia reveal that the advantages of using arbitra-
tion to settle disputes in project financing may not be so clear.67 In 
these project finance arbitrations, the clear contractual obligations to 
arbitrate were given short shrift by the domestic courts of the host 
state, and broadly accepted judicial doctrines protecting international 
arbitration from judicial interference largely were ignored.68 
2. The Patuha and Himpurna Power Projects in Indonesia 
In these two projects, the state-owned electric company of Indo-
nesia, PT Perusahaan Listruik Negara (PLN), entered into Energy 
Sales Contracts (ESCs) with two project companies, which were estab-
lished as subsidiaries of MidAmerican Energy Holdings (formerly 
CalEnergy), the primary foreign sponsor of these projects.69 MidA-
merican's two project companies were Hin1purna California Energy 
Ltd. (Himpurna) and Patuha Power Ltd. (Patuha). 70 Under the Him-
puma ESC, Himpurna agreed to develop a multi-unit power project 
at Dieng geothermal field injava.71 PLN, in turn, committed to pay a 
tariff for available electricity from the project for a period of thirty 
years.72 Similarly, Patuha agreed under its ESC to develop a generat-
ing facility at the Patuha geothermal field, also in Java, with PLN 
63 !d. 
64 !d. 
65 See id. 
66 Sec .t-.fark Kantor, International Project Finance and Arbitration with Public Sector Entities: 
When is Arbitrability a Fiction?, 24 FoRDHAM Iwr'L LJ. 1122, 1125 (2001). 
67 See id. 
68Jd. 
69 !d. at 1126. 
7o R. Doak Bishop et al., Strategic Options Available when Catastrophe Strikes the Major In-
ternational Energy Project. 36 TEx. Iwr'L LJ 635, 686 (2001). 
71 Kantor, supra note 66, at 1126. 
72 !d. 
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again agreeing to pay a tariff for available electricity from the proj-
ect.73 
The state oil company of Indonesia, Pertamina, also entered into 
a joint Operation Contract (JOC) with both of the project companies 
relating to the operation of the geothermal field that would be the 
source of the energy for the projects.74 Both the JOC and the ESC 
were approved "on behalf of the Government of the Republic of In-
donesia" by the Indonesian Minister of Mines and Energy. 75 Further-
more, Indonesia's Ministry of Finance (MoF) issued side letters (MoF 
letters) to each project company stating that as long as the project 
company's material obligations due under the ESC and JOC have 
been fulfilled, the Republic of Indonesia will cause Pertamina and 
PLN, their successors and assigns, to honor and perform their obliga-
tions as due in the above-mentioned contracts.76 
The ESC, JOC and MoF letters all contained a provision under 
which disputes relating to the relevant document would be settled by 
arbitration in Jakarta, Indonesia, under the rules of the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).77 
Moreover, under Section 8.4 of the ESCs, the parties renounced statu-
tory rights under the Indonesian Code of Civil Procedure and appli-
cable Indonesian laws and regulations to appeal the decisions of the 
Arbitral Tribunal (Tribunal).78 The ESCs also provided for Indonesian 
law as the governing law, but the parties also agreed that: 
The Tribunal need not be bound to strict rules of law where 
they consider the application thereof to particular matters to 
be inconsistent with the spirit of this Contract and the un-
derlying intent of the Parties and as to such matters their 
conclusion shall reflect their judgment of the correct inter-
pretation of all relevant terms hereof and the correct and 
just enforcement of this agreement in accordance with such 
terms.79 
The project companies, aware of the acute legal risks of investing 




76 Kantor, supra note 66, at 1127. 
77 Id. 
78 ld. at 1128. 
79 ld. at 1129. 
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forts to take advantage of the adaptability and flexibility of arbitration 
by establishing it as the sole method for resolution of disputes under 
the transaction.80 To protect themselves further, they purchased $290 
million in supplemental political risk insurance coverage from the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and various syndi-
cates of Lloyd's of London.81 This insurance provided for payment 
only when the project companies had exhausted all other legal reme-
dies to enforce their agreements.82 
Once the project structure was in place, the two project compa-
nies obtained financing for the project from various international 
lenders.83 Even though the project assets acted as the only collateral 
for the lenders to prmide this financing (as is the case with most pro-
ject financings), the project was able to obtain a sufficient amount of 
debt financing primarily because of the perceived strength of the 
commitments made by the Indonesian Ministry of Finance and Minis-
try of Mines and Energy in the ESC, JOC and MoF letters.84 These 
commitments, however, were soon overtaken by extraordinary events 
in Indonesia and throughout East Asia.85 
In 1997, the Indonesian economy collapsed under the impact of 
the Asian financial crisis and, shortly thereafter, in early 1998, the 
Suharto regime, which ruled Indonesia for decades, also crumbled 
under the weight of this economic instability.86 Faced with huge ex-
change rate fluctuations as a result of the crisis, PLN considered its 
obligations to purchase power from projects like Himpurna and 
Patuha impossible to perform.87 The fall of the Suharto regime also 
led to a huge amount of political instability in Indonesia and led to 
accusations of state contracts being manipulated to benefit Suharto 
family members and friends. 88 Consequently, the new government 
unilaterally postponed a number of independent power projects, in-
cluding Himpurna and Patuha, and placed several others on review 
status. 89 
00 !d. at 1128-29. 
81 Kantor, supra note 66, at 1131. 
82 !d. at 1132-33. 
83 !d. at 1129. 
84 See id. 
85 !d. 
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Himpurna and Patuha initiated arbitration proceedings against 
PLN, claiming breach of the ESC contracts.90 PLN argued that the 
contracts were not breached but only "suspended as a result of non-
discriminatory governmental measures taken in response to unprece-
dented economic adversity. "9l The arbitration was conducted under 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules and, on May 4, 1999, the three-
member panel awarded $391 million in damages to Himpurna and 
$180 million to Patuha.92 
In making the award, the Tribunal considered, and subsequently 
rejected, a number of alleged defenses raised by PLN, including the 
following: (1) that the project companies failed to satisfY the contrac-
tual requirements in the ESC to engage in good faith settlement ne-
gotiations prior to initiating arbitration; (2) that Indonesian law pre-
vented an arbitral tribunal from ruling on a claim for termination of a 
contract but instead that only a judge could order such termination; 
(3) that decrees of the government of Indonesia in 1998 suspending 
the projects excused PLN from breach; and (4) that the doctrines of 
changed circumstances, force majeure, and good faith excused non-
performance by PLN .93 
PLN was required to pay the arbitral awards to the project com-
panies within thirty days, but failed to do so.94 Consequently, Him-
purna and Patuha filed a second arbitration against the government 
of Indonesia on June 6, 1999, to enforce the guarantees that the gov-
ernment provided in the ESC,JOC and MoF letters.95 
PLN retaliated against these actions by filing a motion to vacate 
the arbitration award in civil court in Jakarta.96 The project companies 
unsuccessfully motioned to dismiss and the civil court refused to en-
force the award.97 Moreover, Pertamina, the state owned oil company, 
sued the two project companies for not including Pertamina in the 
first arbitration proceeding.98 Pertamina claimed that it was a party to 
the agreements between Himpurna/Patuha and PLN.99 As a result, it 
90 Bishop, supra note 70, at 687. 
91 /d. 
92 Id. 
93 Kantor, supra note 66, at 1133-34. PLN also argued that CaiEnergy may have used 
links with former President Suharto to win major contracts in Indonesia. Id. 





99 Bishop, supra note 70, at 687. 
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was successful in obtaining an injunction suspending execution of the 
awards in civil court. too 
With this irtiunction in hand, the Indonesian government re-
fused to participate in the second arbitration initiated by the project 
parties scheduled to take place in The Hague, Netherlands.lOl The 
Indonesian government also filed suit in The Hague to block the tri-
bunal from going forward with the arbitration.1°2 That request was 
denied and the hearings took place.l03 The arbitral panel subse-
quently issued an award stating that the Indonesian government, as a 
result of its guarantee ir1 the project agreements, was obliged to pay 
the awards that were issued in the first arbitration.l04 
After Indonesia's subsequent failure to pay the awards, MidA-
merican, the project's sponsor, filed a claim with OPIC under its po-
litical risk insurance policy obtained for the projects.105 On November 
18th, 1999, after agreeing that MidAmerican had exhausted all its 
possible legal remedies under the contracts, OPIC and various syndi-
cates of Lloyd's of London paid MidAmerican $290 million in a po-
litical risk insurance claim for the transaction. lOB 
The problems faced by MidAmerican in Indonesia have led both 
scholars and practitioners to question whether project financings in-
volving state-owned entities are really arbitrable as a practical mat-
ter.I07 Furthermore, the widespread corruption and chronic political 
instability within Indonesia that led domestic courts to disregard the 
arbitration clauses in the project agreements may also lead to the per-
ception that arbitration is ineffective in these instances because de-
veloping country governments are unable to uphold these agree-






104 Bishop, supra note 70, at 687. 
105 !d. 
106Jd. 
107 Sec Kantor, supra note 66, at 1125-26. 
108 Sec id. 
368 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:355 
3. The Public/Private Distinction and International Arbitration for 
Project Financings 
An alternative explanation for why arbitration in project finance 
transactions is so ineffective is the inherent conflict that arises in ne-
gotiating private law with government entities for matters that have 
traditionally been in the realm of public law and legislatures.109 
The root of this inherent conflict lies in the view of many devel-
oped nations that the law is divided between public law and private 
law.uo Private lawmaking is viewed as the consensual negotiation and 
performance of contracts and the consensual transfer of property be-
tween private parties in society.lll Private lawmaking, therefore, con-
cerns only the parties who desire to create it.ll2 Public lawmaking, in 
contrast, is viewed as the creation of laws by the legislature and the 
government's enforcement of these laws, both of which regulate the 
conduct of individuals in society.II3 
This public/private distinction has pervaded western liberalism 
for centuries.l14 It represents a separation between the spheres of the 
state and civil society.ll5 It also represents a dividing line of ideological 
loyalties.ll6 Those who fully believe in the validity of the pub-
lic/private distinction, therefore, may argue for the inviolability· of 
freedom of contract from public interference, for the privileging of 
individual property rights and for the subsequent limitations of the 
state in seizing private property.ll7 
In the context of international arbitration, the public/private 
distinction can play an important role in the disciplinary sensibility of 
arbiters.ll8 As discussed previously, commercial arbitration tradition-
ally is viewed as a private process for resolving private law-making dis-
putes that is consensual and changeable by the parties.l 19 As a result, 
arbiters view the practice of arbitration as a mechanism of dispute 
resolution that resolves private contractual disputes (not public or 
political controversies), involves the coming together of equals (nei-
109 See Shalakany, supra note 7, at 452-53. 
liO See id. at 453-54. 
m See id. at 455. 
112 See id. 
m See id. at 453-54. 
ll4 Shalakany, supra note 7, at 454. 
liS Id. 
ll6 Id. 
117 See id. at 464. 
liB See id. at 454. 
ll9 HUNTER & REDFERN, supra note 59, at 23. 
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ther of whom are coerced by the state to come to a public forum), 
and resolves private law questions of property rights (not public law 
questions of sovereign potentials) .120 
In the context of international arbitration proceedings for proj-
ect financing transactions in developing countries, this disciplinary 
distinction between public and private lawmaking is especially 
acute. 121 Sponsors of a project will view the financing as a private law-
making matter and, therefore, will view the use of arbitration as a pri-
vate and flexible process which is most amenable to this form of pri-
vate lawmaking.122 In contrast, public entities involved in project 
financing may view the projects as public services over which they 
have final authority. As a result of this difference in perception, these 
state entities may create situations in which they can encroach upon 
the private rights and obligations of the private sponsors in arbitration 
proceedings with the justification that such encroachment is neces-
sary to maintain the sovereignty and authority of the government over 
important public services.I23 
III. DiscussiON oF IssuEs 
A. Arbitration, Project Finance and Pacta Sunt Servanda 
One method through which to understand the decisions of the 
arbiters in project finance arbitration proceedings is to assess their 
possible underlying assumptions about the relationship between for-
eign investors and state entities in private contractual disputes. 124 An 
underlying presumption about this relationship, commonly held by 
arbitral panels, is an adherence to the doctrine of pacta sunt ser-
vauda.125 
In the realm of public international law, the notion of pacta sunt 
servauda is seen as a type of international constitutional law at the very 
base of the international legal system.I26 Drawn from the legal frame-
12o Shalakany, supra note 7, at 455. 
121 Sec id. at 464 (discussing how the public/priYate distinction dictated the decisions 
of the arbiters in the Texaco Award). 
122 Sec HUN'Il:R & REDFERN, supra note 59, at 23. 
123 Sec EsA I'AASIVIRTA, PARTICIPATION oF STATES IN lNTERNAHONAI" CoNTRACTS AND 
ARBITRAL SETILEMENTm" DISPUTES 194 (1990). 
124 Sec generally 1\1. SoRNARAJAII, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE 
PRoBLEM m STATE CoNTRACTS 5-33 (1990). 
125 Sec id. at 24. 
126)\fazzini, supra note 39, at 349. 
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work of the United States and major western European powers, pacta 
sunt servanda has been interpreted to mean that every international 
treaty in force binds the parties to it and requires them to perform in 
good faith.J27 Furthermore, pacta sunt servanda prohibits altering an 
international agreement for any reason except by mutual consent.128 
An adherence to pacta sunt servanda is prevalent in the context of 
international arbitration primarily because arbiters view arbitration as 
a process where private parties can resolve their disputes without the 
interference of state action.129 Furthermore, when one of these pri-
vate parties is actually a public entity, the notion of pacta sunt servanda 
resolves the issue of public interference by holding that public entities 
involved in private contractual matters must legislate and act in a way 
that would not adversely affect the rights of their foreign contracting 
partner.130 
With respect to project finance transactions, however, pacta sunt 
servanda may not provide such clear answers for arbiters.l 31 In many of 
these transactions, the funds for the project come from private 
sources, and the agreements may be signed by state-owned entities in 
their capacity as private contracting parties. 132 At the same time, how-
ever, the great public importance of many infrastructure projects may 
make them amenable to a myriad of government regulations that 
could place them squarely in the domain of public regulation. 133 An 
application of pacta sunt servanda may lead an arbiter to conclude that 
no public regulation can contravene the contractual rights of the for-
eign sponsor that is in a contractual relationship with a state-owned 
entity. This conclusion still leaves open the important issue of whether 
an arbitral decision of this strain contravenes the sovereign rights of 
states to legislate and adjudicate the conduct of their societies.134 
127 !d. at 346. 
128 !d. at 348. 
129 See Shalakany, supra note 7, at 459-60 (discussing how the Texaco-Libyan Oil arbi-
trations decisions were indicative of the application of pacta sunt servanda). 
130 See id. 
131 See Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stallilizing International Investment Commit-
ments: International Law versus Contract Interpretation, 31 Thx. Iwr'L LJ. 216, 242 ( 1996). 
132 See McCutcheon, supra note 8, at 413-14. 
133 See Nassar, supra note 10, at 65. 
134SeeWaelde & Ndi, supra note 131, at 244 (discussing the doctrinal debate between 
the application of pacta sunt servanda and the encroachment on national sm·ereignty o\·er 
domestic law making in the con text of international investment commitments). 
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This problematic application of pacta sunt servanda is noticeable 
in the Himpurna and Patuha project finance arbitrations)35 The Tri-
bunal decided that PLN and the Government of Indonesia had vio-
lated their obligations under the ESC, JOC and MoF agreements be-
cause they had signed the agreements as private parties. This raises 
the issue of whether the decision of the panel was so grounded in the 
public/private distinction that it contravened the new government's 
sovereign right to create policies to deal with the financial and politi-
cal crisis it was experiencing at that time.136 Furthermore, the fact that 
the civil court in Indonesia ruled quite differently than the arbitral 
panel on the same issues raises the related question of whether the 
domestic courts of Indonesia possessed a different paradigmatic view 
toward the situation or, as some scholars have argued, were biased 
categorically towards the foreign investor community in Indonesia at 
that time. 137 
B. International Commercial Arbitration, Project Finance and Contracts 
Among Equals 
Another perspective from which to view the decisions of the arbi-
ters in project finance transactions is that of the legal capacity of each 
of the parties in the project finance agreements in dispute.l3B From 
the paradigm of those adhering to the public/private distinction, the 
parties in project finance disputes should be seen as contractual 
equals, despite the fact that one of the parties in the agreement was a 
state entity who was seeking funds from the private sector.139 Adher-
ents to the public/private distinction believe that the state, when in-
volved in private transactions as a private contracting party, possesses 
1 ~5 Sec generally Kantor, supra note 66, at 1134-36 (discussing the difficulties of the pro-
ject companies in enforcing the arbitral awards in Indonesia). 
136 Sec generally Shalakany, supra note 7, at 465-66 (discussing how arbitration limits the 
sovereignty of Third World countries). 
137 Sec Kantor, supra note 66, at 1125-26 (discussing the resentment of foreign inves-
tors by local interests in Indonesia). 
1!18 See Award on the Merits in Dispute between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Com-
pany/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
Jan. 19, 1977, 17 I.L.M. I, 19 (1978) [hereinafter Texaco Award] (discussing the various 
reasons which could be envisaged in order to justify a defendant Government's behavior to 
suspend a private con tract). 
1 ~9 Sec Shalakany, supra note 7, at 462 (noting that a basic issue that had to be resolved 
in the Texaco decision was whether Libya had contracted in its public law capacity as a 
superior to the oil companies or whether it had contracted in its private law capacity as an 
equal to these companies). 
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no powers to take unilateral action that would breach its obligations 
under that contract.140 
This notion is evident in the Hirnpurna and Patuha arbitral 
awards.l4l In the final arbitral award issued for Himpurna and PLN, 
for instance, the arbitral panel held that the presidential decrees 
postponing the project due to the financial crisis gripping the country 
could not have the effect of releasing PLN, the state entity, from its 
contractual obligations under the force majeure clause of the con-
tract.l42 The panel reasoned that validating such a claim would allow 
PLN to use its unilateral governmental powers to escape liability from 
the contract. 143 
However, despite the result in the Himpurna and Patuha arbitral 
awards, in the context of contracts involving corporations and state 
entities the international legal doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (doctrine 
of changed circumstances), which would allow a state relief from li-
ability when the economic conditions of the country change or the 
welfare of the state requires the contract be rescinded, should have 
greater scope.l44 This argument may be especially convincing in in-
dustries dominated by project finance, such as mining and natural 
resources, where developing countries may have strong incentives to 
maintain a certain level of inherent sovereignty over industries that 
control the destinies of their economies.l45 
C. International Arbitration, Project Finance and State Sovereignty 
A third perspective from which to view the decisions of an arbi-
tral panel with regard to project finance matters is to analyze whether 
the decisions of the panel violated the political sovereignty of the 
country under international law.146 From this perspective, adherents 
to the public/private distinction maintain that the notion of an in-
herent sovereignty of states over their territories lies in the realm of 
140 See id. (discussing how the analysis of the issue of Libya's legal capacity in the Tex-
aco award was hinged on the categorization of Libyan actions as either public or private). 
141 See Himpurna California Energy Ltd. (Bermuda) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahan Lis-
truik Negara (Indonesia), 14 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep., at A-26 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter 
Himpurna-PLN Final Award]. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. at A-27. 
144 SORNARAJAH, supra note 124, at 25-26. 
145 See id. at 31. 
146 See Shalakany, supra note 7, at 464 (discussing how the Texaco award's decision on 
the legality of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was very 
much a function of the location of the principle on the public/private divide). 
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public law, while private property disputes resolved by arbitral panels 
lie in the realm of private law. 147 As a result, in a situation in which a 
state has executed an international agreement with a foreign private 
party, the state cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard commit-
ments and nullifY the rights of the party that has performed various 
obligations under the contract.I4B 
The Patuha and Himpurna arbitral awards demonstrated the is-
sue of whether an arbitral panel's decision to take jurisdiction over a 
state contract violates the authority of state courts. 149 In the arbitral 
proceedings between Patuha and PLN, PLN argued that under the 
Indonesian Civil Code, the termination of a contract in the event of 
failure of performance lies within the exclusive province of the na-
tional courts unless an explicit contractual waiver exists.150 The panel 
dismissed the validity of this argument completely, arguing that the 
language of the Civil Code encompasses the authority of an arbitral 
panel to determine issues of termination within a con tract. I 51 
In spite of this result, the notion that arbitration proceedings are 
private in nature and, therefore, cannot concern themselves with the 
public and sovereign nature of state entities raises the issue of 
whether the decision of an arbitral panel can limit seriously the ability 
of states to enact laws and regulations for the benefit of their socie-
ties.t52 This distinction between the private nature of arbitration and 
the public nature of state policies could even lead to a situation in 
which the contracting state entity would be forced to seek the permis-
sion of the other private parties in a transaction before enacting cer-
tain laws or regulations in order to avoid a breach under the con-
tract.l53 
In the context of project finance, this risk of having a state en-
tity's sovereignty compromised may be acute because the industries 
which predominate project finance, such as natural resources, tend to 
be heavily regulated industries that have particularly strong public 
147 See id. 
148 /d. 
149 See Kantor, supra note 66, at 1133-34. 
150 Sec Patuha Power Ltd. (Bermuda) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahan Listruik Negara (In-
donesia), 14 J\Iealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. at B-14 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter Patuha-PLN Final 
Award). 
151 !d. 
152 Sec Shalakany, supra note 7, at 464 (discussing how the Texaco award indicates that 
"new laws and regulations [issued by the contracting state) must, to affect the contracting 
parties, be agreed to by them."). 
153 Sec id. 
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interest considerations.t54 These public interest considerations may 
necessitate the state contracting party to terminate the contract uni-
laterally when public interests so require.155 Furthermore, these con-
siderations may even necessitate the restriction of available remedies 
for the other private parties that dispute this termination.156 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Blurring of the Public/Private Distinction: Pacta Sunt Servanda 
and the Himpurna and Patuha Arbitration Proceedings 
1. Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Doctrine of Changed Circumstances 
In determining the merits ~f contractual disputes involving state 
entities, pacta sunt servanda has played a prevalent role in the mindset 
of international arbiters.157 As a legal principle, it is the subject ohm-
surpassed international consensus and, according to one arbiter, "no 
international jurisdiction whatsoever has ever had the least doubt as 
to the existence, in international law, of the rule pacta sunt ser-
vanda."158 Consequently, many contraventions of the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda by state contracting parties have been criticized as being 
nothing more than attempts to meddle politically with the private 
sphere of contractual relations.t59 
However, this strict application of the doctrine of pacta sunt ser-
vanda in international commercial arbitrations deserves scrutiny. 160 
First, pacta sunt servanda traditionally has been a doctrine cited as 
authority in the realm of public international law and, more 
specifically, in the law of treaties, rather than in the realm of private 
commercial law.161 Second, even within the realm of public interna-
tional law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not 
154 See PAASIVIRTA, supra note 123, at 123 (discussing how contemporary international 
law recognizes that control over natural resources entails particularly strong considerations 
of public interest). 
155 See id. 
156 See id. at 195. 
157 See Shalakany, supra note 7, at 459 (discussing how Dupuy's decision in the Texaco 
award was highly predicated on the assumption that pacta sunt servanda governed the con-
tractual relationship between the parties). 
158 Jd. 
159 See id. at 460. 
160 See generally SoRNARAJAH, supra note 124, at 24-27 (criticizing the strict application 
of pacta sunt servanda by international arbiters in commercial disputes). 
161 See id. at 24. 
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sanction the strict use of jJacta sunt scrvanda.'62 Article 62 of the Con-
vention recognizes, for instance, that a fundamental change in the 
circumstances existing at the time the treaty was concluded which 
radically transforms the scope of the obligations under the treaty will 
provide a party to the treaty grounds for terminating the treaty.163 
Furthermore, within the realm of investment contracts between 
state entities and foreign private parties, pacta sunt scrvanda cannot 
operate in an absolute sense, not only because it is not applied abso-
lutely in international law, but also because most investment contracts 
operate in a field which falls within the domestic sovereignty of the 
state. 164 As a result, there exists greater scope for applying the doc-
trine of changed circumstances in state contracts, particularly where 
economic conditions change and the welfare of the state requires that 
the contract be rescinded or changed.165 vVithin the context of project 
finance transactions, this argument may be especially relevant when 
one considers that under international law states are recognized to 
have a certain degree of sovereignty over their natural resources and 
that a public emergency may require them to take unilateral action 
which is likely to affect the rights of foreign contracting parties to an 
agree men t. 166 
2. Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Himpurna and Patuha Arbitral Awards 
The decisions of the arbitrators in the Himpurna and Patuha ar-
bitral awards clearly presented the doctrinal assumptions of pacta sunt 
servanda.' 67 In both sets of awards, the Tribunal considered PLN's ar-
gument to apply the doctrine of changed circumstances as a result of 
the Asian financial crisis, but subsequently ruled that PLN and the 
Indonesian Government were still liable respectively for their obliga-
tions under the project agreements. 168 
In an opening statement before the arbitral panel, the lead coun-
sel for PLN poignantly evoked the economic context for his argument 
to apply the doctrine of changed circumstances: 
162 Sec id. at 25. 
163Jd. 
164 !d. 
165 SoRNARAJAH. supra note 124, at 26. 
166 Sec I'AASIVIRTA, supra note 123, at 194-95. 
167 Sec Patuha-PLN Final Award, supra note 150, at B-31. 
168 !d. at B-33; Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 141, at A-41. 
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The Tribunal has to address the claims which are before it 
against the background of the economic collapse that pre-
ceded the presidential decrees in the last quarter of 1997 
and made them necessary. This collapse and its conse-
quences are an important element of the changed circum-
stances affecting these contracts. 
I do not wish to burden you with statistics, but some are 
quite interesting. In 1998 to 1999, the Indonesian economy 
contracted by 15 per cent, resulting in more than 5 million 
workers losing their jobs. The rupiah, although it has been 
more stable in recent months or weeks, has lost more than 
80 percent of its value since the crisis first erupted. 
Out of a population of 200 million, the number of seri-
ously poor people in Indonesia is projected to reach 130 mil-
lion in 1999 as a result of the impact of the decline in job 
opportunities and an inflation rate that exceeded 75 percent 
last year. 169 
Given this change of circumstances, PLN argued that the role of 
the Tribunal was limited to "leaving the parties to renegotiate the 
contracts in accordance with the principles that apply when there has 
been such a fundamental change of circumstances. "170 PLN also reit-
erated that Indonesian law "does not permit" Himpurna to claim 
damages for breach of the ESC under the doctrine of changed cir-
cumstances.171 PLN supported this contention by arguing that the 
doctrine of changed circumstances is recognized in Indonesian law as 
a corollary of the duty of good faith, which appears in Article 1338 of 
the Indonesian Civil Code.172 Furthermore, PLN also invoked Articles 
1244 and 1245 of the Civil Code, which contain the basic principles 
pertaining to force majeure provisions of contracts.173 
The Tribunal conceded that, under Indonesian law, situations 
exist in which the rule of good faith may operate to dissolve or trans-
form contractual rights or obligations.174 However, the Tribunal made 
it quite clear that it reserved such a remedy for extreme cases and, 
more importantly, that the fundamental principle of pacta sunt ser-
169 Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supm note 141, at A-38. 




174 Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 141, at A-39. 
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vanda forms the bedrock of civil obligations everywhere.t75 The Tri-
bunal then proceeded to point out the number of defects in PLN's 
arguments for changed circumstances in light of the doctrine of pacta 
swnt servanda. 176 
In the first instance, the Tribunal noted that PLN violated its duty 
of good faith to abide by the contract under pacta sunt servanda by 
never responding to the project companies' offers to renegotiate the 
contract. 177 Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the project compa-
nies did not have any duty to accept unilateral suspension of the ESC. 
Indeed, it had a right to treat PLN's unresponsiveness as a breach.t7s 
Second, the Tribunal concluded that the doctrine of changed 
circumstances requires that one take into account the weight of ca-
lamitous events on both parties in a transaction.179 In this situation, 
the Asian financial crisis led to socio-economic pressure on the Indo-
nesian government, but it could have also led to the bankruptcy of 
Himpurna and Patuha as project companies if the obligations of the 
contract were not met. 180 In the Himpurna arbitral award, the Tribu-
nal noted that: 
By its count, the Claimant invested some US$289 million in 
the project. To argue that PLN may simply walk away from its 
contractual obligations without any regard to these invest-
ments, and to say that this argument is based on considera-
tion of good faith, is certainly unacceptable. PLN has never 
explained why the full brunt of the financial crisis should be 
deflected on to an innocent party which, moreover, is simply 
seeking to rely on a contract as it is written.tst 
The third defect that the panel found in PLN's argument is that 
PLN's contractual allocation of risk with the project companies pre-
vents PLN from relying on the Civil Code oflndonesia to relieve itself 
from liability under a doctrine of changed circumstances.l82 Under 
the force majeure clause in Section 9 of each ESC, the parties ensured 
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main with PLN by only allowing for the project company to claim that 
an act of the government of Indonesia constitutes an event of force 
majeure.I83 As a result, the parties rejected the notion that PLN could 
rely on a governmental act-even in response to an economic crisis-
to undo its contractual obligations.I84 
As a result of these defects, the Tribunal concluded that PLN 
could not relieve itself from liability under a doctrine of changed cir-
cumstances, and furthermore, that PLN had violated its duty of good 
faith under pacta sunt servanda not to take unilateral action that would 
breach its obligations under a contract. 185 In response to the argu-
ment that a rigorous reading of the relevant agreements might exac-
erbate Indonesia's political and economic crisis and greatly impede 
governmental efforts to alleviate the crisis, the Tribunal responded: 
These entreaties fall on the entirely sympathetic ears of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, and so they must be perceived by people 
of good will everywhere. But such considerations cannot de-
ter the Arbitral Tribunal from carrying out its task in accor-
dance with the mandate it has been given by the Parties. The 
arbitrators cannot usurp the role of governmental officials or 
business leaders. They have no political authority, and no 
right to presume to impose their personal view of what 
might be an appropriate negotiated solution. Whatever the 
purity of their intent, arbitrators who act in such a fashion 
would be derelict in their duties, and would create more 
mischief than good. The focus of the Arbitral Tribunal's in-
quiry has been to ascertain the rights and obligations of the 
parties to the particular contractual arrangements from 
which its authority is derived.l86 
B. The Himpurna and Patuha Arbitral Awards and Loyalty to the 
Public/P1ivate Distinction 
The attitude and tenor of the awards in Himpurna and Patuha 
reveal a typically strong loyalty to the public/private distinction on the 
part of the Tribunal. The Tribunal separated political and social con-
cerns from its rigorous analysis of the contractual relationship be-
183 Id. 
184 Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 141, at A-39. 
185 I d. at A-41. 
186 I d. at A-40. 
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tween the parties.187 According to its proponents, the advantages of an 
adherence to the distinction are its emphasis on the legitimate expec-
tations of the parties, as well as principles of good faith and estop-
pel,188 Furthermore, the Tribunal in the Himpurna and Patuha 
awards pointed out that to act in any other way would "contribute to 
international uncertainty, which in itself would inhibit international 
trade and investment. "189 
This dogged adherence to the public/private distinction in arbi-
tral awards like Himpurna and Patuha, however, is subject to criti-
cism.190 First, the Tribunal in these two decisions invoked the doctrine 
of pacta sunt servanda in the context of an investment contract involv-
ing a state entity, even though this doctrine traditionally is invoked in 
the context of international treaties. 191 The Tribunal never indicated 
in the awards how it was able to make such a leap of logic, especially 
considering that the applicable law under the ESC was Indonesian 
law, which would have perhaps led to the conclusion that the doctrine 
of changed circumstances and force majeure should relieve PLN from 
the ESC.t92 Even though the Tribunal had the right to derogate from 
Indonesian law under the ESC to enforce the spirit of the contract, 
this right does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that PLN 
breached the ESC. Most international sources of law support the view 
that, instead of the loose rhetoric of pacta sunt servanda, stricter con-
siderations such as constitutional principles of legal systems tend to 
cast doubt on the ability of states to fetter their future legislative free-
dom with a private contract.I93 
Moreover, an adherence to pacta sunt servanda in this case may be 
regarded as a derogation from the principle of state sovereignty in 
187 See generally id. at A-39 to A-40 (discussing how the political and financial situation 
in Indonesia cannot relieve PLN of its liability under the ESC under the doctrine of pacta 
sun! seroanda). 
188 See PAASIVIRTA, supra note 123, at 168-69 (discussing the arguments of proponents 
for stabilization clauses in international contracts with state entities). 
189 Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 141, at A-41. 
190 See PAASIVIRTA, supra note 123, at 169 (discussing the flaws in the argument that 
violations of stabilization clauses in state contracts constitute an internationally unlawful 
act). 
191 See SoRNARAJAII, supra note 124, at 25 (discussing the lack of a basis for arguing 
that pacta sunt servanda should be rigorously applied to state contracts with foreign private 
parties). 
192 Kantor, supra note 66, at 1129; Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 141, at A-39. 
193 See PAASIVIRTA, supra note 123, at 169 (discussing how a strict adherence to stabili-
zation clauses may lead to violations of state sovereignty). 
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internationallaw.I94 Although the power projects here do not repre-
sent natural resources over which the host state can claim permanent 
sovereignty,I95 the public interest of the Indonesian state in regulating 
its utilities, especially in light of the Asian financial crisis, may have 
justified a certain level of independence for the state in temporarily 
suspending or terminating the ESC.I96 
C. Contracting as Equals and the Himpuma and Patuha ATbitral AwaTds 
1. Contracting as Equals and the Administrative Contract 
The notion that state entities and foreign private corporations act 
essentially as equals in their capacity as parties to a private contract is 
also part of the paradigm of arbiters in international commercial arbi-
tration proceedings.I97 Contractual equality is hinged on the pub-
lic/private distinction that the state as a private actor is different from 
the state as a public actor because, in some state contracts, the state 
will expressly waive its right to amend laws or regulations that would 
affect the rights and obligations of the parties under the agree-
ment,l9B The logical implication of contractual equality is that an at-
tempt by the state to take unilateral action to amend contractual obli-
gations will be found to be unlawful per se under the international 
law of contracts.I99 
194 See id. at 170. 
195 See id. at 183-84 (discussing the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources and how it has been incorporated as a principle of in ternationallaw). 
196 See id. at 194-95 (discussing the prevalence of administrative contracts in many 
countries). The ESC and other agreements in the Himpurna and Patuha transactions 
could be construed as "administrative" or "public" contracts, which reflect a necessary 
accommodation of public or state interests and the interests of individuals. I d. 
197 See STEVEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 
111 ( 1987). This view of equality can be extrapolated from the view of some scholars that, 
in a contract between a state and an alien, the use of the sovereign authority of the state, 
contrary to the expectations of the parties, to abrogate or violate a contract with an alien, 
is a violation of international law. Id. 
198 See PAASIVIRTA, supra note 123, at 168-69 (discussing how the incorporation of sta-
bilization clauses restricts the use of state prerogatives in a contract with a foreign private 
party through the law of treaties). The public/private distinction is couched in this case 
within the context of stabilization clauses, which are express waivers by a state to use its 
legislative or sovereign authority in connection with a contract with a foreign private party. 
/d. 
199 See id. at 168. 
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The opposing view is that contracts with state entities should be 
analyzed under an administrative or public contracts doctrine.2oo This 
doctrine, which is generally acknowledged in Continental and Anglo-
American legal systems, effectively skirts the rigid boundaries of pri-
vate law in the face of public regulatory intervention.2o1 The adminis-
trative contract doctrine assumes an essentially unequal relationship 
between the parties, in which the state may exercise its coercive power 
to take unilateral action in amending its legal obligations.2°2 The state 
in this case presumably is guided in such actions by the dictates of 
public interest. 203 In the context of project finance transactions, this 
doctrine of the administrative contract may be highly relevant consid-
ering the public importance of many projects to the countries in 
which they are built.204 
2. The Administrative Contract Doctrine and the Himpurna and 
Patuha Arbitral Awards 
The Tribunal did not explicitly address the idea that PLN could 
be excused from liability under the doctrine of administrative con-
tract; however, it implicitly dismissed the possibility of this defense by 
holding that the MoF letter essentially bound Indonesia to Himpurna 
and Patuha under the appropriate principles of contract law.205 In 
both the interim awards against the Republic of Indonesia and the 
final awards against PLN, the Tribunal noted that the state's (or state 
entity's) undertaking of the obligations of the ESC and MoF letters 
prevented it from using governmental action as an excuse for non-
performance under the force majeure clauses of the contract.206 De-
spite the large public interest in revising the terms of the contract be-
cause of the Asian financial crisis, the Tribunal noted that the focus of 
2oo Sec Shalakany. supra note 7, at 461-62 (criticizing the decision of the Texaco arbitral 
tribunal to dismiss the argument that the concession agreements constituted an adminis-
tratiYe contract). 
201 !d. at 461. 
20~ !d. 
203 !d. 
204 Sec Nassar, supra note I 0, at 65. 
205 Sec Patuha Power Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia, 15 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. at B-28 
(jan. 2000). 
2°6 Sec id. (discussing how the Indonesian CiYil Code does not provide for valid im-
pediments for a non-performing party unless those impediments are insurmountable, 
irresistible, and external to the will of the defendant); Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra 
note 141, at A-40 (discussing how PLN cannot rely on the Indonesian Civil Code to excuse 
its non-performance under the ESC because it had already expressly fashioned a contrac-
tual allocation of risk with Himpurna in case of goYernmen tal action). 
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its inquiry must be to ascertain the rights and obligations of the par-
ties to a particular contract. Social and economic circumstances, if 
within the contemplation of the signatories, cannot be considered a 
valid excuse for non-performance.2°7 Because PLN expressly waived its 
right to suspend the contract as a result of any Indonesian govern-
mental actions, any unilateral action by PLN with respect to the ESC, 
even if such action represents a directive from the government, con-
stitutes a breach of private contractual obligations.2os 
This perspective has some troubling aspects, the foremost of 
which is the possibility that the government of Indonesia's undertak-
ing in the MoF may have had the effect of limiting the sovereignty of 
the state by regulating the utilities industry in light of the Asian 
financial crisis.209 Under principles of international law, in fact, such a 
perspective appears difficult to maintain considering the established 
precedent that a contract between a sovereign state and a foreign pri-
vate entity is usually governed by a municipal legal system, and not the 
law of treaties.21o 
C. State Sovereignty and the Himpuma and Patuha Arbitral Awards 
1. State Sovereignty and International Arbitration in Project Financ.e 
Transactions 
Traditionally, sovereignty is known as a principle of international 
law that provides for certain rights and powers.211 Contracts, in turn, 
may be conceived as a type of property.212 These two concepts imply 
that as far as contracts with state entities are concerned, the applica-
ble law between a foreign party and a state or state entity is the law of 
the host state.213 In the context of the Himpurna and Patuha project 
finance disputes, the application of the host state's law would imply 
that provisions of the Indonesian Civil Code allowing for suspension 
2°7 SeeHimpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 141, at A-40. 
20s See id. at A-39. 
209 See SoRNARAJAH, supra note 124, at 13-14. (noting the speciousness of the claim 
that an agreement between a foreign private entity and state is binding because the state, 
pursuant to its sovereignty, had limited its sovereignty by agreeing to be so bound). 
210 See id. at 14 (arguing that municipal law of the state, and not an international law of 
contract, should govern the contractual relationship between a foreign private entity and a 
state entity). 
211 PAASIVIRTA, supra note 123, at 175. 
212 Jd. 
213 SeeSoRNARAJAH, supra note 124, at 14. 
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of a contract in case of a change in fundamental circumstances may 
have been applicable to the relationship between the parties.214 
In international arbitration proceedings, however, these assump-
tions about the sovereignty of the host state in determining the appli-
cable law of its state contracts have been undermined.215 The pub-
lic/private distinction prevalent in the mind of the arbiter separates 
the permanent sovereignty of the state from its ability to enter into 
private contractual agreements with foreign entities.216 As a result, 
once a state enters into a contract to undertake certain commitments 
with a foreign private party, it willingly concedes some of its sovereign 
ability to legislate and regulate the foreign party on certain matters.217 
This theory of bifurcating the states' power into public and pri-
vate spheres is problematic since international law does not fully rec-
ognize the legal personality of foreign corporations.21s Furthermore, 
within the context of project finance transactions, this desire to bifur-
cate the sovereignty of the host state in the public and private realms 
is difficult considering the public importance of many infrastructure 
projects, especially natural resource projects, which have been recog-
nized as being under the permanent sovereignty of states in accor-
dance with internationallaw.219 
2. The Himpurna and Patuha Arbitral Awards and State Sovereignty 
The arbitral awards that resulted from the Himpurna and Patuha 
project financings definitely indicate a preference for sovereignty 
concessions. That is, the Republic of Indonesia had conceded some of 
its domestic legal authority over the project companies through its 
undertakings in the ESC and MoF Agreements.22o The awards also 
make it clear that PLN's argument that the ESC violates the Indone-
sian constitution is completely specious since PLN entered into nu-
merous con tracts with Pertamina and various foreign investors plusu-
214 See Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 141, at A-39 (discussing PLN's claim 
that doctrine of changed circumstances under Indonesian law relieved PLN from liability 
under the ESC). 
215 See SoRNARAJAII, supra note 124, at 12 (noting how foreign investors who were in-
creasingly fmstrated with domestic courts attempted to fashion a new set of norms empha-
sizing the primacy and immutability of the ul\'estmen t contract). 
216 Sec id. at 13. 
217 See id. 
218 Sec id. at 14. 
219 Sec Nassar, supra note I 0, at 65; PAASIVIRTA, supra note 123, at 184. 
220 Sec Himpurna-PLN Final Award, supra note 141, at A-39. 
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ant to the presidential decrees, which now they themselves are claim-
ing to be unconstitutional.221 
Nevertheless, one can argue that the Tribunal's decision to sepa-
rate the political and financial crisis that gripped Indonesia in 1997 
from its obligations to foreign investors under state contracts poten-
tially hinders the government in making economic reforms by regu-
lating the utilities industries.222 Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether the government and PLN even had the legal ability to cede 
its sovereignty over Himpurna and Patuha through the ESC and MoF 
since both parties lack the legal personality to participate in the in-
ternational legal system.223 
CoNCLUSION 
The Himpurna and Patuha cases not only reveal the difficulties 
of using international arbitration as a form of dispute resolution for 
project finance transactions in developing countries, but also they re-
veal the asymmetric perceptions that still exist between developed and 
developing countries on the best way to achieve international eco-
nomic integration. Developing countries in recent years have increas-
ingly grown receptive to the flow of foreign direct investment to cre-
ate important infrastructure, but at the same time, they are wary of 
the effects that this type of foreign investment will have on their abil-
ity to manage politically in response to international economic 
fluctuations. Foreign investors have also grown eager to enter devel-
oping markets to build large infrastructure projects, yet they are wary 
of the ability to manage the political risk that comes with these in-
vestments. 
If foreign investors and developing countries continue to grow 
increasingly dissatisfied with international arbitration as a process to 
minimize these risks, it is questionable whether an alternative form of 
dispute resolution, such as mediation, could act as an agreeable sub-
stitute for all parties in a project finance transaction. As a result, the 
prospects for continued infrastructure growth in the developing 
world may hinge on the international arbitral community making a 
paradigmatic shift away from the public/private distinction and to-
wards a more balanced view that recognizes the limited sovereignty of 
states over infrastructure projects of public importance. 
221 See id. at A-22. 
222 See id. at A-40. 
223 See SoRNARAJAH, supra note 124, at 14. 
